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Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd.: The Burden of Proof
and Offensive Collateral Estoppel
In Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. I the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was confronted with the problem of deciding the collateral es-
toppel2 effect of facts found to be determinative of the choice of law
issue in a prior action in maritime tort.3 The court also had to deter-
mine the proper method of deciding the collateral estoppel question,
particularly in terms of allocating the burden of proof.4 Finding that
the business operation of the defendant was inherently subject to
changes in circumstances which could affect the choice of law, the
court held that the prior decision 5 did not serve to preclude defend-
ant from relitigating that issue because plaintiff had failed to meet
her burden of proving that the earlier decision should be accorded
collateral estoppel effect. 6 Dracos thus raises important questions
about the offensive use of collateral estoppel in the federal courts.
Nicholas Dracos, chief engineer of the M/V HELLENIC STAR,
was found dead aboard ship on May 14, 1977, while the ship was
berthed in Norfolk, Virginia. 7 Maria Dracos, Nicholas' wife and the
administratrix of his estate, sued Hellenic Lines Ltd., owner of the
STAR and Nicholas' employer, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia. Mrs. Dracos based her claim on
provisons of the Jones Act8 and on "general maritime law." 9
1 762 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
2 "The doctrine ofresjudicata prohibits a party from relitigating the same claim in a
subsequent suit on the same cause of action, while collateral estoppel . ..prohibits a
party from retrying a previously tried issue in a subsequent suit on a different cause of
action." Note, Alternative Grounds in Collateral Estoppel, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1085, 1085
(1984).
3 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 349.
4 Id. at 350, 352.
5 Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
6 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 352-53.
7 Id. at 350.
8 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982) provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may ...maintain an action for damages at law [in United States federal
courts]. . . and in the case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such
personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an
action for damages at law [in United States federal courts] ....
Id. Although seemingly unconditional in its grant of a U.S. forum to injured seamen, the
Jones Act has been construed as having inherent limitations:
But Congress ...wrote these all-comprehending words, not on a clean
slate, but as a postscript to a long series of enactments governing shipping.
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Hellenic contended throughout the district court proceeding
that the law of the United States did not apply and therefore the
court lacked jurisdiction to try the case. Hellenic argued that Greek
law governed the dispute' 0 because Hellenic was incorporated in
Greece, the Dracos' were both Greek citizens, and the employment
contract between Nicholas Dracos and Hellenic provided that
"Greek law in Greek courts [would] control the rights and liabilities
arising from the employment relationship."' "
After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, defendant filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In considering this motion
the court "concluded that neither federal law nor general maritime
law of the U.S. applied" and therefore the court was without
jurisidiction. 12
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, two issues were considered on
rehearing en banc.' 3 First, the court examined the question of the
applicability of U.S. law to the case. The court used two Supreme
Court decisions which set forth nine factors to be examined when
considering the applicability of U.S. law in a maritime tort context.
In Lauritzen v. Larsen 14 the Supreme Court enumerated seven factors
which impact on the choice of law:
(1) the place of the wrongful act, (2) the law of the flag, (3) the alle-
giance or domicile of the injured seaman, (4) the allegiance of the
defendant shipowner, (5) the place of the execution of the employ-
ment contract, (6) the inaccessability of the foreign forum, and
(7) the law of the forum. 15
All were enacted with regard to a seasoned body of maritime law developed
by the experience of American courts long accustomed to . . .reconciling
our own with foreign interests and in accommodating the reach of our own
laws to those of other maritime nations ..
By usage as old as the Nation, such statutes have been construed to ap-
ply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be consid-
ered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1952). TheJones Act thus has been held to confer
on federal courts the right to provide a remedy only when certain criteria are met. See infra
note 15 and accompanying text.
9 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 350.
10 Id.
II Id. at 351.
12 Id. at 350.
13 In Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392 (4th Cir. 1983), the court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's decision and issued a majority opinion which virtually is
identical to the opinion issued by the court after a rehearing en banc. Dracos, 762 F.2d at
348. The dissent ofJudge Murnaghan was not reproduced in the second opinion, but the
judge referred to his earlier opinion and advanced additional arguments against the en
banc majority opinion. Id. at 353-54 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
14 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
15 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 351. See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-91. Applying these factors,
the Court found that the parties were "both Danish subjects, the events took place on a
Danish ship not within territorial waters" of the United States, and the contract of employ-
ment specified that Danish law would govern disputes arising from the employment rela-
tionship. Weighing this evidence against the fact that the employment contract was signed
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In Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis 16 the Court emphasized that the Lau-
ritzen criteria were neither mechanical in their application nor ex-
haustive in their scope, and two additional factors were set forth: the
shipowner's "base of operations" and his "operational contacts"
with the United States.1 7
Applying these criteria to Dracos, the court of appeals found that
only two "relatively unimportant" factors, the place of the tort and
the law of the forum, favored the application of U.S. law.18 An exam-
ination of the remaining factors pointed to the appropriateness of
applying Greek law. 19 The court thus held that the district court had
not erred in concluding that U.S. law did not govern the action and
therefore the court lacked competency to decide the case.20
Additionally, the court of appeals considered the collateral es-
toppel effect of a determination in Rhoditis that Hellenic was in fact
amenable to suit in U.S. courts by way of a Jones Act proceeding.2 1
In Rhoditis the Court found that Hellenic's owner, Pericles Callimani-
poulos, had resided in the United States for twenty-five years, that
Hellenic's base of operations was in the United States, and that Hel-
lenic had extensive business contacts with the United States. These
factors rendered U.S. law appropriate and subjected Hellenic to lia-
bility under the Jones Act.22 The court in Dracos, however; refusTed
to allow plaintiff to use Rhoditis as collateral estoppel to prevent de-
fendant from relitigating the choice of law issue, holding that the
district court had not abused its discretionary authority in not giving
Rhoditis this preclusive effect.3
in New York and that service on defendant was made there, the Court concluded that the
Jones Act was not applicable. Id. at 592-93.
16 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
17 Id. at 308-10. The Court found that although the seaman was Greek, the employer
was a Greek corporation, and the employment contract was executed in Greece, these
factors were "minor weights in the scales compared with the substantial and continuing
contacts" with the United States of the defendant corporation. Defendant Hellenic was
thus held subject to Jones Act liability. Id. at 310.
18 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 351. There has been some disagreement concerning the rela-
tive importance of the place of the tort. Some courts have, contrary to the court in Dracos,
characterized this factor as a significant one in the choice of law determination. E.g.,
Papaioannoiu v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 569 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Contra Ullah
v. Canion Shipping Co., 589 F. Supp. 552, 556 (D. Md. 1984), afd, 755 F.2d 1116 (4th
Cir. 1985).
19 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 351-52.
The defendant shipowner and employer was a Greek corporation. Its vessels
flew the Greek flag and were registered under Greek law. Both the plaintiff
and her husband were Greek citizens and domiciliaries. The contract of em-
ployment between Nicholas Dracos and the defendant was drafted and exe-
cuted in Greece. . . . Maria Dracos had remedies available in a Greek court
had she chosen to seek them.
Id. at 351.
20 Id. at 351-52.
21 Id. at 352-53. See supra note 17.
22 Rhodih, 398 U.S. at 309-10.
25 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 352-53.
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
A brief examination of the emergence of the offensive use of
collateral estoppel will prove helpful in analyzing the court's decision
in Dracos. Collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion," was limited ini-
tially by the doctrine of mutuality. Under this doctrine the party as-
serting the estoppel and the party to be estopped had to have been
parties in or privies to the previous action.2 4 To better promote the
goals of collateral estoppel25 and to eliminate a rule generally viewed
as outmoded and unjustified,2 6 however, courts began to loosen or
entirely reject the requirement of mutuality.2 7
The federal courts formally discarded the doctrine of mutuality
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation.28 The
Court in that case sanctioned the defensive use of collateral estoppel,
allowing the defendant "to estop the relitigation of an issue that the
plaintiff had already unsuccessfully litigated in a suit against another
defendant."' 29 Such use of estoppel by a defendant not a party to the
prior litigation would, the Court believed, improve the allocation of
judicial resources by giving plaintiffs an incentive to join all possible
defendants in the initial action and thereby prevent piecemeal litiga-
tion of the same issue.30
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 31 the Court took the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel one step further by holding that a
plaintif could, under certain circumstances, use a prior decision offen-
sively to estop a defendant from relitigating an issue that defendant
had lost in prior litigation in which the plaintiff was not a party.3 2 In
approving the use of offensive collateral estoppel, however, the
Court was quick to recognize the potential for abuse. The Court
noted that, unlike defensive collateral estoppel, offensive collateral
estoppel gave possible plaintiffs a disincentive to join in an ongoing
action in which they might have an interest. Instead, potential plain-
tiffs might be tempted to "wait and see" how the litigation was re-
solved in the hopes of asserting a decision favorable to them as
collateral estoppel in a later suit brought on their behalf.3 3
Further, the Court constructed a number of scenarios in which
application of collateral estoppel offensively might prove unfair to
24 See Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
25 "Regardless of how phrased, the claimed benefits of... [issue] preclusion, may
be reduced to two primary and interrelated goals, efficiency and consistency." Flanagan,
Offensive Collateral Estoppel: Inefficien-y and Foolish Consistency, 1982 ARIz. ST. LJ. 45, 49.
26 Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
27 Id. Justice Traynor found that the doctrine had been virtually excepted to death in
many jurisdictions, thus making outright rejection of the mutuality requirement a less than
revolutionary move. Id.
28 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
29 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 352.
30 Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29.
31 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
32 Id. at 331-32.
33 Id. at 329-30.
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the defendant. For instance, in cases where the defendant lacked the
incentive to litigate the first action fully and vigorously, or where the
defendant has available in the second action procedural opportuni-
ties not available in the first action, there would be attendant unfair-
ness in allowing a plaintiff to use collateral estoppel offensively.3
4
These potential shortcomings notwithstanding, the Court ap-
proved the offensive use of estoppel subject to a grant of broad dis-
cretion to trial courts in deciding when application of the doctrine
would be appropriate.3 5 In exercising this discretion, courts have
examined exactly what was litigated in the prior action, the "suffi-
ciency of the prior litigation," 3 6 and whether giving preclusive effect
to the prior decision will work some unfairness on the defendant.3 7
Under the auspices of the "unfairness" standard, courts have
held that a change in "facts essential to ajudgment will render collat-
eral estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent action raising the same
issues." s38 Thus, where the passage of time produces a change of
circumstances, factual determinations made in one time period may
"not necessarily [serve as] an estoppel as to other time periods." 39
Recognizing the potentially erosive effect of the "changed circum-
stances" rule on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, however, courts
have allowed evidence of changed circumstances to obviate the use
of collateral estoppel only when the factual situation has been "vi-
tally altered" between the time of the first and second actions. 40
The problem remains, however, as to what method the courts
should use to decide whether a change in circumstances warrants re-
jection of the use of offensive estoppel. Consistent with the grant of
broad discretion favored in Parklane,4 1 commentators have embraced
a flexible approach to the allocation of the burden of proof in the
"changed circumstances" area.42 Where the probability of meaning-
34 Id. at 330-31.
35 Id. at 331. "The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily
have joined in the earlier action or where. . . the application of offensive collateral estop-
pel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive
estoppel." Id.
36 Flanagan, supra note 25, at 55-56, 59.
37 Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 89 (6th Cir. 1980).
38 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 159 (1979).
39 International Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449, 455
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963).
40 E.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 846 (3d Cir. 1974). See
also Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa 1980). "Circum-
stances in the baseball card market have changed dramatically and materially since 1965, and
the defense of collateral estoppel is therefore unavailable to Topps." Id. at 513 (emphasis
added).
41 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 comment c (1982) provides:
Sometimes, there is a lack of total identity between the matters involved in
the two proceedings because the events in suit took place at different times.
In some such instances, the overlap is so substantial that preclusion is plainly
appropriate. . . . In other instances the burden of showing changed or dif-
1986]
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ful change is very low, a court may be justified in refusing to allow
any attempt to prove changed circumstances; conversely, where the
probability of change is extremely high, the court may refuse to give
the first finding any preclusive effect whatever. 43 In cases lying be-
tween these extremes, commentators have suggested that the prior
determination be given a presumptive effect of varying weight:
The greatest presumptive effect is to presume that the facts were as
found, and to reject preclusion only if it can be shown that new and
different facts have in fact occurred since the time of the first
trial. . .. [L]ess effect could be given by considering preclusion
only upon some preliminary showing that probably there has not
been any change in the fact setting.4 4
Given the wide discretion available to courts in determining the
proper allocation of the burden of proof, cases in which this issue
has played a significant role have been the exception rather than the
rule. Dracos, however, is a case where this problem was a major issue.
In deciding the collateral estoppel issue in Dracos, the court em-
phasized the traditional concepts stressed in Parklane: broad discre-
tion vested in the trial court and flexible application of collateral
estoppel governed by overriding considerations of fairness. 45 In ex-
amining the possibility that a substantial change in circumstances
had rendered offensive estoppel inapplicable, the Fourth Circuit
found persuasive the district court's reasoning that the "earlier adju-
dication reflected the status of the defendant only as it existed sev-
eral years prior to the accrual of the [present] cause of action
.... ,,46 The court further found that the shipping industry was
"inherently subject to change" and represented a "changing factual
situation that may require the choice of American law. . . one year
but may not require the same choice some years later."'47 Given this
ferent circumstances should be placed on the party against whom the prior
judgment is asserted. ... In still other instances, the bearing of the first
determination is so marginal because of the separation in time and other
factors negating any similarity that the first judgment may properly be given
no effect.
Id.
43 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4417,
at 160 (1981).
44 Id. In Dracos the dissent appears to embrace the former position while the majority
seems to prefer the latter.
45 Drcos, 762 F.2d at 353.
46 Id. at 352.
47 d. at 353. The dissent challenged the majority's factual analysis concerning Hel-
lenic and the shipping industry. Judge Murnaghan argued that the record was void of
convincing evidence that the circumstances surrounding Hellenic's operation had in fact
changed. He claimed that the majority had based its refusal to give preclusive effect to
Rhoditis on the "mere possibility of change--a truism [which] should [not] be allowed to
render meaningless a factual finding reached a dozen years before after full, fair and vigor-
ous litigation which, at least as likely as not, is dispositive of the case currently before us."
Draces, 705 F.2d at 1398-99 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
There is some indication that a vigorous examination of the factual data surrounding
Hellenic's operations at the time Nicholas Dracos died might have revealed evidence suffi-
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propensity for change, the court held that the district court had acted
within its discretion in refusing to give preclusive effect to Rhoditis.48
While applauding the district court's flexible use of discretion-
ary authority, the court of appeals adopted a rather rigid approach to
allocating the burden of proof on the issue of "changed circum-
stances." Because the choice of law issue was deemed to be essen-
tially jurisdictional in nature49 and plaintiff bore the burden of
proving that the district court was competent to hear the case,50 the
court held the burden was on plaintiff to prove that the facts as estab-
lished in Rhoditis had not been altered substantially by the passage of
time and events. 5 ' The court thus adopted a restrictive form of pre-
sumption-,the prior litigation would be presumed to have no estop-
pel effect unless plaintiff came forward with proof that the factual
situation remained substantially the same from one action to the
next. Rather than examining objective factual evidence regarding
aent to warrant application of U.S. law. Although the court of appeals makes reference to
the district court's examination of evidence, Dracos, 762 F.2d at 351, there is little explica-
tion of the exact information culled from this review. In Papaioannoiu, however, the court
undertook a thorough study of evidence concerning Hellenic's operations. The court
found:
Although a greater number of the LauriUten-Rhoditu factors point to Greece,
the more significant. . . factors point to the United States. . . . [T]he acci-
dent occurred in the port of New York. Furthermore, the allegiance of the
shipowner [Gregory Callimanopoulos, Pericles' son and successor] is a mix-
ture of Greek and American. . . . Plaintiff has shown substantial business
activity by Hellenic in this country. Plaintiff has also proved that Hellenic
and Gregory have a base of operations in the United States and that Hellenic
has substantial dealings in commerce affecting the United States. Under
these circumstances. . . this court, applying Lauritzten and Rhoditis, finds that
plaintiff has carried his burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence
that jurisdiction exists in this matter.
Papaioannoiu, 569 F. Supp. at 728.
48 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 353.
We do not hold that the approach taken by the district court. . . is obliga-
tory in each case, only that the approach it took was within its discre-
tion. . . . [I]f the facts . . . are inherently subject to change, then a district
court may be justified in giving the prior finding no preclusive effect.
Id.
49 The Supreme Court has objected to this categorization of the issue.
As frequently happens, a contention that there is some barrier to granting
plaintiff's claim is cast in terms of an exception to jurisdiction of subject mat-
ter. A cause of action under our law was asserted here, and the court had
power to determine whether it was or was not well founded in law and in fact.
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 575. See also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354 (1959). "Petitioner asserts a substantial claim that the Jones Act affords him a
right of recovery for the negligence of his employer. Such assertion alone is sufficient to
empower the District Court to assume jurisdiction over the case and determine whether, in
fact, the Act does provide the claimed rights." Id. at 359.
50 Dracos, 762 F.2d at 350.
51 Id. at 353.
Unless it is shown that the condition found at a first trial is so permanent as
to be unlikely to be disturbed, then we think offensive collateral estoppel may
not be used with respect to that condition unless it be shown that the facts
upon which the condition was based continued to exist.
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the nature of the shipping industry and its propensity to change sub-
stantively over time, the court relied on its "judicial ability to bend
common experience to assessing the relative pace and probability of
factual change" 52 within the industry.
The dissent objected to the court's allocation of the burden of
proof, arguing that the Rhoditis decision ought to have been given a
positive presumptive effect. Under this approach, the facts as found
in Rhoditis would be presumed to be extant, and the burden would be
on Hellenic to rebut this presumption by introducing evidence of
changed circumstances. The majority approach, the dissent urged,
forced plaintiff "to remake, if indeed not reinvent, the entire wheel,"
and "carried the concept of 'changed circumstances' to an extreme
that saps the collateral estoppel doctrine of its vitality."53
Dracos is thus part of a trend toward recognizing the limitations
of the offensive use of collateral estoppel and restricting its applica-
tion. As experience with this doctrine has grown, criticism of offen-
sive estoppel has mounted. -4 Courts have been reluctant to allow
collateral estoppel in complex litigation in which the subject matter
is perceived to be inherently dynamic. 55 That there is controversy
concerning application of the doctrine and therefore much reliance
on the use of discretionary judgment is hardly surprising given the
recency of Parklane's authorization of offensive estoppel and the po-
tential for unfairness to litigants inherent within its operation.56
Viewed within this framework, then, the decision in Dracos should not
come as unexpected.
The reluctance of the court in Dracos to allow use of offensive
estoppel could have important ramifications. If courts follow the ap-
proach taken in Dracos and place on plaintiff the burden of proving
that circumstances have not changed before granting preclusive ef-
fect to a prior decision, a shift in the focus of the courts will occur.
The focus of most courts faced with the problem of issue preclusion
currently is upon "peripheral" issues such as "what was litigated in
the first case, the sufficiency of the prior litigation, and whether it
should be applied in the present case." 57 Forcing the plaintiff to
prove the continuing validity of factual determinations shifts the fo-
cus of the court back to the "merits of the common issues."58
Whether such a shift is desirable is arguable. While increased focus
by the courts on the "merits" intuitively may be appealing, such a
52 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 4417, at 162.
53 Dracos, 705 F.2d at 1398 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
54 See Flanagan, supra note 25.
55 See Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel To Fupl Its Promise: An Examina-
tion of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REv. 141 (1984).
56 Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 ND. LJ.
615, 634 (1980).
57 Flanagan, supra note 25, at 59.
58 Id. at 55-56.
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shift would defeat the purpose of collateral estoppel-saving party
and judicial resources by preventing relitigation of issues already de-
cided in full and fair adjudication.
The Dracos decision is thus troubling for a variety of reasons.
The majority decision regarding the burden of proof, based on con-
ceptions of "judicial notice" of the inherently dynamic nature of the
shipping industry, is open to criticism. The court advanced little in
the way of empirical, objective evidence that the industry is generally
volatile, or that Hellenic demonstrated a propensity for continual
substantive change. 59 Lacking such evidence, the court's decision to
place on plaintiff the heavy burden of proving lack of change appears
unreasonable.
Moreover, the decision to allocate the burden of proof in this
manner seems to be rooted in a misapprehension of the choice of
law issue as a jurisdictional question.60 By so categorizing the issue,
the court intertwined the burdens of proving that the court had juris-
diction, that U.S. law should govern, and that Rhoditis should have
been given preclusive effect. This intermingling of issues led the
court to the fallacious conclusion that if plaintiff must prove jurisdic-
tion, and ifjurisdiction depends on choice of law, and if choice of law
is the issue plaintiff seeks to estop defendant from relitigating, then
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the appropriateness of the es-
toppel. The court missed the logical conclusion that if the issue of
preclusion was first decided separately and independently from the
question of jurisdiction, the choice of law issue would also be dis-
posed of and plaintiff might thereby meet the court's burden of es-
tablishing jurisdiction.
The foregoing discussion leads to several conclusions. First, the
question of the burden of proof on the estoppel issue must be de-
cided solely on the basis of an examination relating to the fairness of
allowing preclusion in light of the possibility of changed circum-
stances, and not on the basis of where the burden of proof concern-
ing the issue sought to be precluded lies. Second, only when the
evidence of the static or dynamic nature of the facts is clearcut
should the court absolutely deny or compel collateral estoppel rather
than giving the prior adjudication some sort of presumptive effect.
Third, given that the factual situation in Dracos was the subject of
dispute and open to disparate interpretation, 6' the allocation of the
burden of proof on the estoppel question should have been based on
a more thorough examination of the factual data rather than on a
conception of "judicial notice" of the nature of the shipping industry
in general and the operations of Hellenic in particular.
59 Dracos, 705 F.2d at 1399 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
60 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
1986]
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The approach advocated by the dissent 62-giving Rhoditis a posi-
tive presumptive estoppel effect that Hellenic might rebut by pro-
ducing sufficient evidence of changed circumstances-meets the goal
of treating the parties to the subsequent litigation fairly while retain-
ing the advantages of judicial economy cited as crucial in Parklane.
This approach would place on Hellenic, the party most likely to have
access to such information, the burden of producing evidence con-
cerning the company's business contacts, base of operations, and al-
legiance of ownership. 63 Moreover, the goal of judicial economy
would be served because plaintiff would not be forced to relitigate
the choice of law issue unless there was an actual need to do so,
based on the introduction of empirical, documentary evidence of a
substantive nature.6 The better approach would therefore have
been to remand the case to the district court for a determination of
the choice of law issue using the presumption advocated by Judge
Murnaghan in his dissent.
-JOHN D. SHUGRUE
62 Se, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
63 Draco, 705 F.2d at 1401 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
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